BYU Law Review
Volume 2014 | Issue 1

Article 5

4-30-2014

Salience and Sin: Designing Taxes in the New Sin
Era
Rachelle Holmes Perkins

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Tax Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Rachelle Holmes Perkins, Salience and Sin: Designing Taxes in the New Sin Era, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 143 (2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2014/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

DO NOT DELETE

3/10/2014 11:19 AM

Salience and Sin:
Designing Taxes in the New Sin Era
Rachelle Holmes Perkins*
I. INTRODUCTION .....................................................................145
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SIN TAXES .............................................149
A. The Legacy of Sin Taxes ...............................................149
B. The Rise of Sin Taxes...................................................152
C. Expanding Sin Tax Base .............................................153
D. Expanding Sin Tax Justifications ................................157
III. AN EXPLORATION OF TAX SALIENCE ....................................159
A. The Empirical Studies .................................................160
B. The Criticisms of Low Salience Taxes ............................164
1. Lack of transparency ............................................. 164
2. Distribution concerns ............................................ 166
3. Distortionary income effects ................................... 168
C. Other Elements of Salience ...........................................171
1. Overall levels of salience......................................... 171
2. Salience and elasticity ........................................... 173
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR SALIENCE IN SIN TAX DESIGN ...................174
A. Salience, Sin Taxes, and Revenue Generation ...............175
B. Salience and Pigovian Taxes ........................................176
C. Salience and Taxpayer De-Biasing ...............................178
D. Salience and Mixed-Motive Sin Taxes ........................182
V. CONCLUSION .......................................................................184

* Assistant Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law. The author
would like to thank Diane Ring and Adam Rosenzweig for their insightful comments. The
author would also like to thank the participants of the Washington University School of Law
Tax Colloquium, who provided extraordinarily thoughtful suggestions. I also thank the
attendees of the Henry G. Manne Faculty Forum and the Robert A. Levy Fellows Workshop in
Law & Liberty for their helpful feedback. Research assistance from Eric Liberman and Megan
Clearwaters is gratefully acknowledged.

143

DO NOT DELETE

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/10/2014 11:19 AM

2014

Tax salience reflects the extent to which consumers take into account
the after-tax cost of a good or service prior to making their consumption
decision. Recent empirical work on tax salience has revealed something
that is perhaps intuitive but nevertheless important to the design of sin
taxes: taxpayers are more likely to make consumption decisions based on
pre-tax rather than post-tax prices when the salience, or visibility, of a
tax is diminished. Thus, consumers are less likely to change their
demand for a particular product if shelf prices are tax-exclusive rather
than tax-inclusive. Economically, this makes low salience taxes mimic
some of the benefits of taxes on inelastically demanded goods. Because a
taxpayer’s demand change in response to a tax increase is diminished,
the deadweight loss generated by the imposition of the tax can be
reduced. Notwithstanding the potential for efficiency gains, politicians
and academics alike have expressed various fairness, distributional, and
normative concerns regarding the use of low salience taxes. In fact, a
number of countries already require tax-inclusive pricing for consumer
products in order to purportedly preserve consumer awareness
and transparency.
In contrast, I argue that lawmakers should not rush to reject taxexclusive pricing outright and should continue to explore the benefits of
low salience taxes in select situations. To the extent lawmakers are able
to minimize economic distortions, the concerns that have been expressed
are not always fatal. I develop a new analytical rubric for tax salience
and determine that the appropriate use of salience for any particular
tax is dependent on a number of factors. These factors include the price
elasticity of demand, the potential for countervailing income effects,
and whether the tax is intended to raise revenue or modify taxpayer
behavior. As a normative matter, I find that selectively implemented
low salience taxes can be beneficial. However, I do not believe they
should be universally implemented in sin tax design. In fact, in another
expansion on the current literature, I argue that in certain situations
lawmakers may best benefit from high salience taxes. I propose that these
taxes may have efficiency benefits when lawmakers are seeking to
influence taxpayer behavior. Ultimately, while it is difficult to draw
definitive conclusions regarding the optimal use of tax salience given
that many empirical and theoretical aspects of salience have yet to be
developed, the empirical work done to-date suggests that the impact of
tax salience on tax design may be significant and is worth exploring.
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Salience and Sin
I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, two separate but important trends have
emerged in tax law. First, the implementation of sin taxes, or taxes
on behaviors that are deemed to be socially undesirable, has rapidly
expanded at all levels of government. In fact, most increases in state
budgets are now in the form of sin taxes. 1 While sin taxes on alcohol
and tobacco are longstanding fixtures in the U.S. economic system, 2
in this new sin tax era legislators are rapidly expanding both the
scope and magnitude of their taxing powers. 3 In addition to
responding to mounting budgetary pressures to raise revenue, some
legislators are also turning to sin taxes in hopes of modifying
undesirable taxpayer behaviors on the basis of theories advanced by
the new surge of behavioral economists. 4 Regardless of their
purported or true motivations, lawmakers have now extended their
taxing powers well beyond the traditional “sins” of smoking and
drinking and are now imposing levies on everything from tanning to
strip clubs. 5 As used herein, the term “sin taxes” refers not only to
the traditional taxes on cigarettes and alcohol, but also to this
extended new class of sin taxes, whether imposed in the form of an
excise or sales tax and whether intended to raise revenue or modify
taxpayer behavior. Moreover, while this Article explores the impact
of salience on this new expanded class of sin taxes, the analysis and

1. Rachel E. Morse, Resisting the Path of Least Resistance: Why the Texas “Pole Tax”
and the New Class of Modern Sin Taxes are Bad Policy, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 189, 198
(2009) (citing DANIEL CLIFTON & ELIZABETH KARASMEIGHAN, AMERICANS FOR TAX
REFORM, STATE TAX TRENDS OVER TWENTY-FIVE YEARS: TAX INCREASES DOWN, REVENUE
SOURCES
SHIFTING
5,
at
2–4
(2006),
available
at
http://heartland.org/sites/all/modules/custom/heartland_migration/files/pdfs/
20327.pdf.).
2. Sin taxes first appeared as temporary taxes on alcohol to fund the U.S. treasury
during wartime. For a detailed discussion of the history of sin taxes, see Jendi B. Reiter,
Citizens or Sinners? The Economic and Political Inequity of “Sin Taxes” on Alcohol and Tobacco
Products, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 443 (1996).
3. See Part II infra.
4. See, e.g., Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Studying Optimal Paternalism,
Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 186 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159
(2003); Jonathan Gruber & Botond Köszegi, Is Addiction “Rational”? Theory and Evidence,
116 Q. J. ECON. 1261 (2001).
5. See generally Bruce Bartlett, Taxing Sin: A Win-Win for Everyone?, 128 TAX NOTES
1289 (Sept. 20, 2010); Tough Times Boost Push for Taxes on Porn, Strip Clubs, THE
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 27, 2009.
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conclusions throughout can easily be applied to any form of excise or
sales tax, whether or not it falls directly within the sin rubric.
Second, the burgeoning field of behavioral economics has begun
to yield important empirical and theoretical work regarding the
impact of tax salience. 6 Tax salience, as the term is used in this
Article, represents the extent to which the presentation of a tax
affects how the taxpayer integrates the after-tax price of goods and
services into his or her consumption decision. 7 Levels of tax salience
can be thought of as existing on a sliding scale ranging from low to
high, with full (or neutral) salience lying somewhere in between. As
applied in the context of sin taxes, sales taxes, which are generally
imposed at the register, represent a low salience implementation of a
tax. Even though a consumer may know the applicable sales tax rate,
unless he or she undertakes to calculate the tax on the spot, the
ultimate after-tax cost of the product will not be explicitly provided
until he or she pays for the good. Excise taxes, which are typically
included in the shelf price of a product, represent a fully salient
implementation of a tax. Prior to purchasing a good, a consumer can
fully account for the total cost of the product, including the
applicable tax. Non-reusable bag taxes, which are now in place in any
number of localities nationwide, are typically explicitly imposed at
the register and can reflect a high level of salience. 8 In many
instances, consumers must explicitly affirm the use and number of
bags they would like to use and are then charged for the
bags accordingly. 9
6. See, e.g., Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and
Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 1145 (2009); Amy Finkelstein, EZ-Tax: Tax Salience and Tax
Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. 969 (2009); Brian Galle, Hidden Taxes, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 59
(2009); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience: Market Salience and
Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19 (2011); Deborah H. Schenk, Exploiting the Salience Bias
in Designing Taxes, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2011); Jacob Goldin, Optimal Tax Salience
(2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009108.
7. See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 23. This is to be distinguished from
political and other forms of salience, which are also found in the tax salience literature. Id. at
20 (defining “political salience” as how “tax presentation affects voting behavior and
political outcomes”).
8. For a more complete discussion of high salience taxes, see Part III.C infra.
9. For example, this process is used in Washington, D.C., where consumers are
charged five cents for every disposable bag that they use at the grocery store. At checkout,
consumers are first asked whether they will be using any disposable plastic bags or whether
they brought their own. If the consumer wants to use the store’s plastic bags, he or she is
notified that the bags are five cents each and the number of bags used is then counted and the
tax is assessed as an add-on to the consumer’s total purchase.
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The level of tax salience may significantly impact a taxpayer’s
response to the imposition of the tax. While additional research must
be done before definitive conclusions can be reached, preliminary
evidence suggests that taxpayers systematically perceive their tax cost
as being less or more than their actual cost depending on the tax’s
salience level. 10 For example, suppose a good has a pre-tax price of
$1.79 and is subject to a tax of 10 cents. Tax salience literature
suggests that consumers faced with a shelf tax-exclusive price of
$1.79 coupled with a sales tax of 10 cents later added at the register
will respond less to the imposition of the tax than they would to a
shelf tax-inclusive price of $1.89. This holds true even if they are
fully aware that their purchase is subject to a tax of 10 cents in both
scenarios. In other words, the lower the tax salience, the less
responsive the taxpayer will be to the imposition of the tax and
vice versa.
These findings are important because they imply that not all
similarly priced taxes will change taxpayer behavior equally, and thus
modify important assumptions found in public finance models. 11 It is
typically assumed that individuals optimize fully with respect to
taxes. 12 This central principle, however, depends in part on the
assumption that the taxes imposed are fully salient—that is, taxpayers
will respond to changes in taxes in the same way they respond to
changes in price. 13 This is important because economic models
assume that when taxes are imposed, taxpayers and suppliers will
modify their behavior in an effort to avoid the tax, and thereby
generate inefficiencies. However, the tax salience literature finds that
if tax salience is lowered, taxpayers will dampen their response to
changes in the after-tax price of goods, potentially resulting in fewer
distortive economic effects. 14
Despite the potential for efficiency gains, politicians, academics,
and economists have expressed concerns about the use of “hidden”
or less salient taxes. 15 Even the label of so-called hidden taxes has a

10. See Chetty et al., supra note 6, at 1165; Finkelstein, supra note 6, at 971; see also
Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 24; Goldin, supra note 6, at 2.
11. Chetty et al., supra note 6, at 1148; Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 26.
12. Chetty et al., supra note 6, at 1145.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1172–73; Goldin, supra note 6, at 3; Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at
61–62; See also Galle, supra note 6, at 77–78.
15. Galle, supra note 6, at 112; Lilian Faulhaber, The Hidden Limits of the Charitable
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pejorative connotation. Arguments against the use of low salience
taxes range from intuitions about general concepts of fairness to
concerns about potential distortionary income and distributional
effects. 16 Indeed, a number of other countries actually require taxinclusive pricing on consumer goods. 17 Even here in the United
States, last year the Department of Transportation mandated that
airlines begin including taxes in their advertised ticket prices on the
theory that the airlines were hiding the true cost of air travel
from consumers. 18
Notwithstanding the growing tide against low salience pricing
models for consumer goods, I join the small minority of scholars,
such as David Gamage and Darien Shanske, that have begun to
argue that to the extent lawmakers are able to minimize economic
distortions, they should be able to exploit the benefits of low salience
taxes. 19 In particular, I believe that none of the concerns raised todate are fatal, and there is a potentially valuable use for tax salience in
tax design. In an effort to advance the scholarly analysis in this area,
in this Article I examine how the specific structure of sin taxes can
best incorporate salience theory. I specifically expand on the existing
literature by arguing that the efficacy of sin taxes will depend greatly
on other related factors, including the likelihood of distortive income
effects, the underlying elasticity of the targeted tax base, and whether
the overall goal of the sin tax is to raise revenue or modify taxpayer
behavior. In addition, while the current literature focuses exclusively
on the benefits of taxes with low salience, which decrease a taxpayer’s
response to after-tax price changes, I also explore the potential
benefits of high salience taxes, or changes in the presentation of taxes
that heighten a taxpayer’s reactions to increases in taxes. 20 I argue

Deduction: An Introduction to Hypersalience, 32 B.U. L. REV. 1307, 1308 (2012) (citing
Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1861, 1933–37 (1994));
Hayes Holderness, Note, Price Includes Tax: Protecting Consumers From Tax-Exclusive Pricing,
66 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783 (2011); Richard M. Bird, Visibility and Accountability: Is
Tax Inclusive Pricing a Good Thing?, 58 CAN. TAX J. 63, 92 (2010).
16. See Chetty et al., supra note 6, at 1173–74.
17. See Holderness, supra note 15, at 783 (noting the European Union, Israel, and New
Zealand all require tax-inclusive pricing).
18. The new rules went into effect January 26, 2012. See generally Press Release, U.S.
Dep’t of Transp. (Jan. 23, 2012), available at http://www.dot.gov/affairs/2012/dot0812.html.
19. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 60; Goldin, supra note 6, at 3.
20. I attach a different meaning to the term “high salience” from the one Lilian
Faulhaber ascribes to “hypersalience.” See Faulhaber, supra note 15, at 1309. Faulhaber defines
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that, in certain situations, high salience taxes may also have the
potential to lessen economic distortions, although this effect is much
less clear given the potential countervailing substitution and
replacement market effects.
Part II of this Article discusses the evolution of sin taxes in the
United States. The use of sin taxes has expanded on national and
state levels, including the escalation of taxes imposed on traditional
sin behaviors as well as the rapid addition of new sin tax targets.
Justifications for the imposition of sin taxes are also evolving. Part III
reviews the recent empirical studies exploring the effects of tax
salience. It also discusses the potential impact of tax salience on sin
tax design, and addresses key concerns that have been raised. Part IV
outlines a broad categorical framework for my recommended
optimal exploitation of salience in the design of sin taxes, specifically
focusing on sin taxes intended to raise revenue, Pigovian sin taxes,
sin taxes intended to de-bias taxpayers, and sin taxes with a mixture
of underlying motives. Part V concludes.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF SIN TAXES
A discussion of the evolution of sin taxes is important because it
underscores the diverse nature of sin taxes. The scope of the sin tax
base has grown dramatically. Theoretically speaking, taxpayers’
responses to taxes on cigarettes that are intended to raise revenue
cannot be expected to necessarily correlate with their responses to
soda taxes that are intended to curb obesity. I believe that it is
helpful to have a sense of the development of sin taxes in order to
conduct a more robust examination of their potential interaction
with tax salience.
A. The Legacy of Sin Taxes
The country’s long legacy of sin taxes on alcohol and tobacco
has helped pave the way for the evolution of its modern-day
progeny. Perhaps the first example of a sin tax in the United States
was the tax on the sale of whiskey that was passed at the urging of
President George Washington’s Secretary of the Treasury, Alexander
hypersalience as occurring “when a tax provision is fully—or almost fully—salient, but the
limits restricting that provision’s application are hidden, or less salient.” Id. at 1309. Using the
charitable deduction as her primary example, she claims that taxpayers overestimate the tax
savings because they underestimate the limits restricting their ability to realize the savings.
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Hamilton, in order to help pay off the national debt incurred during
the Revolutionary War. 21 This tax, which was imposed as an excise
tax on domestically distilled spirits, was the first tax levied by the
national government on a domestic product, and ultimately led to
the Whiskey Rebellion of 1791. 22 While primarily viewed as a
revenue raiser, Secretary Hamilton also believed that it would work
to instill “a measure of social discipline.” 23
A more permanent excise tax on alcohol was levied in 1862 in
order to generate revenue to pay for the Civil War. 24 Although the
tax was lowered at the end of the war, it remained in effect, even
during Prohibition when the sale of alcohol was illegal. 25 Ironically, a
primary reason for the end of Prohibition was the government’s need
to raise additional tax revenue as a result of the economic strain
caused by the Great Depression. 26 The legalization of alcohol
allowed the United States to revive one of its most dependable and
substantial revenue bases.

21. See, e.g., Murray N. Rothbard, The Whiskey Rebellion: A Model for Our Time?, THE
FREE MARKET (1994).
22. WILLIAM HOGELAND, THE WHISKEY REBELLION: GEORGE WASHINGTON,
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AND THE FRONTIER REBELS WHO CHALLENGED AMERICA’S
NEWFOUND SOVEREIGNTY, 27 (NY Scribner 2006).
23. SAMUEL E. MORRISON, OXFORD HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1778–1917, at
182 (1927). He also believed that it was a tax that would be the least objectionable to
taxpayers and at the same time would help raise awareness about the negative effects of alcohol
use. See HOGELAND, supra note 22, at 63; THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER, THE WHISKEY
REBELLION: FRONTIER EPILOGUE TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, at 100 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1986).
24. Reiter, supra note 2, at 447 (citing Joint Comm. of the States to Study Alcoholic
Beverage Laws, Impact on Alcoholic Beverage Control of Taxation and Mark-Up: An Official
Report at 7 (1953)).
25. Id. at 448.
26. Id.; LEONARD V. HARRISON & ELIZABETH LAINE, AFTER REPEAL: A STUDY OF
LIQUOR CONTROL ADMINISTRATION 173 (1936) (“The repeal of prohibition was brought
about as much by the need for revenue as by the desire to eradicate the evils that grew out of
that social experiment. The economic depression made it impossible for either federal or local
governments to derive enough funds from the already over-burdened taxpayers. . . . It was
readily recognized that legalized liquor provided a partial solution.”). Today, a similar strategy
has been contemplated in California with marijuana. A bill was introduced in California’s state
legislature to impose a $50 per ounce tax on marijuana, which if legalized, would become
California’s number one cash crop, bringing in over $1 billion a year in state taxes. See
generally John Blackstone, Pot Tax has $1.4B Potential in California, CBS NEWS (Aug. 2,
2009),
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/08/02/eve
ningnews/main5205369.shtml.
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Excise taxes on alcohol, and eventually tobacco, continued to
prove lucrative. They remained the government’s primary source of
revenue until 1913 when the Sixteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution was passed, authorizing the federal income tax. 27
Even today, the United States government raises substantial revenues
from the excise taxes on alcohol and tobacco, yielding annual
receipts of approximately $7.5 billion and $15.9 billion,
respectively. 28 On the state and local level these excise taxes are just
as lucrative, with alcohol generating almost $6 billion annually, 29 and
tobacco products generating over $16.5 billion annually. 30
While historically these taxes were primarily enacted as revenue
raisers, the rationale for and discourse about these taxes have evolved
over time. Today these taxes are primarily justified on moral and
paternalistic grounds, and “[t]he increase in excise taxes on tobacco
has mirrored society’s condemnation of these products.” 31 This
evolution of the justification of the traditional sin taxes from
primarily revenue-based, to primarily morality-based, has set the
stage for the expansion of sin taxes to other areas where consumers
are engaged in purportedly socially disapproved behaviors. 32

27. The Sixteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was ratified on
February 3, 1913. See also David J. DePippo, I’ll Take My Sin Taxes Unwrapped and
Maximized, with a Side of Inelasticity, Please, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 543, 546 (2002); Reiter,
supra note 2, at 444; Chris L. Winstanley, A Healthy Food Tax Credit: Moving away from the
Fat Tax and Its Fault-Based Paradigm, 86 OR. L. REV. 1151, 1168 (2007).
28. Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, National Excise Tax Receipts, in TTY
FY 2012 BUDGET-IN-BRIEF, at 6, available at www.ttb.gov/pdf/budget/2012cj.pdf.
29. Tax Policy Center, State and Local Alcoholic Beverage Tax Revenue, Selected Years
1977–2009
(Oct.
15,
2012),
available
at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?
DocID=399&Topic2id=90&Topic3id=92.
30. Id. In 2009, thirty states imposed an excise tax on cigarettes at a rate equal to or
greater than $1 per pack, with New York leading the way at $2.75 per pack. NATIONAL
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 2009 PROPOSED STATE TOBACCO TAX INCREASE
LEGISLATION
(Apr.
27,
2009),
available
at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/Tobacco_Tax_bill09.htm#Federal09;
Governor
David Paterson, Executive Budget Presentation (Dec. 16, 2008), available at http://
publications.budget.state.ny.us/eBudget0910/ExecutiveBudget.html.
31. Robert Creighton, Comment, Fat Taxes: The New Manifestation of the Age-Old
Excise Tax, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 123, 126 (Jan.–Mar. 2010).
32. Bartlett, supra note 5 (“[I]n recent years, there have been many efforts to expand
sin taxes to include other activities that are thought to be socially harmful—or perhaps just not
socially favored.”).
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B. The Rise of Sin Taxes
The rise of sin taxes in the United States has been the product of
a perfect storm of economic and political conditions. Record deficits
and a struggling economy have placed legislators in the difficult
position of having to fill government coffers with revenue from an
anemic tax base that is determinedly resistant to income tax hikes.
The worst recession since the 1930s resulted in a record federal
deficit of $1.6 trillion for the 2011 budget fiscal year. 33 Although the
deficit decreased during fiscal 2012, it still reached a staggering $1.1
trillion. 34 Likewise, the recent recession has resulted in the steepest
decline in state tax receipts on record. 35 State tax collections,
adjusted for inflation, are now twelve percent below pre-recession
levels, while the need for state-funded services has increased. 36
Lawmakers are faced with tough choices as they struggle to
provide their constituents with basic services. Increasingly the
solution to this budgetary quandary is sin taxes. Politicians have
discovered that these taxes can serve as meaningful revenue raisers
that garner significantly less widespread political resistance than
traditional taxes, usually because the taxes are either not intended to
apply to the majority of taxpayers, or because the tax is intended to
promote some opposition-resistant social good. 37 Although general

33. See GOV’T PRINTING OFFICE, Budget Totals, in THE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR
2012, Table S-1, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2012BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2012-BUD-29.pdf.
34. Id. See also, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, UPDATED BUDGET PROJECTIONS:
FISCAL
YEARS
2013
TO
2023
(May
2013),
available
at
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/44172-Baseline2.pdf at 8.
35. ELIZABETH MCNICHOL ET AL., CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES,
States Continue to Feel Recession’s Impact (Jan. 21, 2011) available at
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=711#_ftn1. Even after making very deep spending
cuts over the last two years, states continue to face large budget gaps. At least forty-six states
struggled to close shortfalls when adopting budgets for the FY 2011, which began July 1 in
most states. These came on top of the large deficits that forty-eight states faced in fiscal years
2009 and 2010. To balance their 2011 budgets, states had to address fiscal year 2011 gaps
totaling $130 billion, or twenty percent of budgets in forty-six states.
36. Id. (citing Center on Budget and Policy Priorities analysis of Rockefeller Institute,
Census Bureau, and Bureau of Labor Statistics data).
37. See Jordan E. Otero, Banking on Sin: States Profit as Taxes Rise on Vice, THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, Oct. 26, 2011; Catherine Rampell, For Cash-Strapped States, Sin Is Sure
Lucrative, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, at WK5; Janet Novack, Pole Dancing and Other Sins,
FORBES, May 10, 2010, at 28, 30; Cari Tuna & Justin Scheck, Strapped States Find New
Virtues in “Vice”, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2010.
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tax levies used to be the obvious answer to government deficits,
“voters in every state have taken to rejecting tax hikes, directly, by
voter referenda, or indirectly, by voting legislators out of office.” 38
Because of this vigorous opposition to general tax increases, sin taxes
are one of the few ways lawmakers have been able to raise revenue
without widespread political backlash. 39 As a result, more lawmakers
are turning to sin taxes in lieu of levying general broad-based taxes.
C. Expanding Sin Tax Base
National and state legislators have expanded both the scope and
prevalence of sin taxes in two primary ways. First, lawmakers have
significantly increased the already high sin taxes on alcohol and
tobacco. 40 In February of 2009, President Obama signed a law that
tripled the federal excise tax on tobacco products. 41 Since January
2009, at least twenty-two states have increased their tobacco taxes
and seven states either enacted new taxes on alcohol or raised
existing ones. 42 In fact, New Hampshire currently generates over
one-third of its total tax revenue from excise taxes, with over eleven
percent coming solely from cigarette taxes. 43
Second, lawmakers have aggressively expanded the types of
behaviors and activities that are taxed. They are both legalizing
previously denounced behaviors in order to pull them into the tax
38. Morse, supra note 1, at 190–91 (citing Daniel Clifton & Elizabeth Karasmeighan,
Americans for Tax Reform, State Tax Trends over Twenty-Five Years: Tax Increases Down,
Revenue
Sources
Shifting
5,
at
2–4
(2006),
available
at
http://
www.heartland.org/custom/semod_policybot/pdf/19711.pdf); Sandra Fabry, Reliance on
“Sin” Taxes Draws Opposition, BUDGET & TAX NEWS, June 2005, available at http://
www.heartland.org/policybot/results.html?articleid=17059.
39. Phineas Baxandall, Taxing Habits: When it Comes to State Taxes, Sin is in, FED. RES.
BANK OF BOSTON REG’L REV., 1st Quarter 2003, at 19–26. This is not to say that no sin taxes
face significant opposition. Many sin tax proposals have been defeated due to pressures by
lobbyists and/or constituents. Nevertheless, the overall opposition is significantly less than
what is typically faced upon proposal of a general tax hike.
40. See supra notes 30–32 and accompanying text.
41. Children’s Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-3, 123 STAT. 8 (2009); Brad Schiller, Obama’s Poor Tax, WALL ST. J, Apr. 1, 2009, at
A21, 25.
42. Robert Creighton, Comment, Fat Taxes: The New Manifestation of the Age-Old
Excise Tax, 31 J. LEGAL MED., Jan.–Mar. 2010, at 123, 129.
43. Babak A. Rastgoufard, Too Much Smoke and Not Enough Mirrors, 36 URB. LAW 411,
417–18 (2004) (33.5 percent of New Hampshire’s tax revenues are generated by excise taxes);
Cindy Kibben, N.H. Per-capita Excise Taxes Among Nation’s Highest, N.H. BUS. REV. (June
23, 2011).
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base and making formerly benign activities more “sinful” in order to
pull them within the sin tax rubric. Sin taxes are now aimed at
consumers making any number of perceived unhealthy consumption
choices, 44 including adult entertainment-related activities, ecoviolations, and countless other purportedly undesirable products
and services.
The most popular targets for new sin taxes are unhealthy
consumption choices. Soda taxes, which are already currently in
effect in over forty states, have been contemplated on a national level
as well. 45 Taxes are also being levied on unhealthy things we do to
our bodies. The 2010 Affordable Care Act included a ten percent
federal tax on indoor tanning services. 46
Often seen as an easy target in terms of garnering public support,
adult entertainment establishments and pornographic materials have
also become the subject of new sin taxes. Since 2004, Utah has had a
ten percent state pole tax imposed on strip clubs. 47 A $5-percustomer tax on strip clubs went into effect in Texas in 2008. 48 It is

44. Whether it is fat taxes, soda taxes, sugar taxes, or tanning taxes, lawmakers are now
eying unhealthy consumption choices as potential revenue bases. Interestingly, one of the first
areas lawmakers targeted for sin-type taxes, outside of cigarettes and alcohol, was junk food. In
fact, so-called “fat taxes” have existed in some form, albeit limited, since the 1920s. Chris L.
Winstanley, A Healthy Food Tax Credit: Moving Away from the Fat Tax and Its Fault-Based
Paradigm, 86 OR. L. REV. 1151, 1171 (2007). These original taxes, however, pre-dated most
public health concerns relating to obesity and were viewed strictly as revenue-raisers. They
included taxes on items such as soft drinks, candy, chips, and ice cream. Id. at 1171–72.
45. Kelly D. Brownell & Thomas R. Frieden, Ounces of Prevention—The Public Policy
Case for Taxes on Sugared Beverages, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1805, 1805 (2009).
46. 26 U.S.C. § 5000B (2012). The tax became effective July 1, 2010. According to
the Joint Committee on Taxation, the tanning tax will raise an estimated $2.7 billion over ten
years, and will help fund the $940 billion healthcare overhaul. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION,
JCX-61-09, ESTIMATED REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE MANAGER’S AMENDMENT TO THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE
ACT”
(Dec.
19,
2009),
available
at,
http://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=3641.
47. When originally enacted, the tax also applied to escort services, but the Utah
Supreme Court struck down this portion of the bill as unconstitutional in 2009. Bushco v.
Utah State Tax Comm’n, 225 P.3d 153 (Utah 2009), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 455 (2010).
48. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 47(B) (West 2008). Right after the Texas pole tax
took effect, the adult entertainment businesses in Texas filed suit charging that the tax violated
their First Amendment right to freedom of expression. In March 2008, a Texas state district
court judge ruled that the tax was indeed unconstitutional. However, the tax was upheld by
the Texas Supreme Court. Combs v. Tex. Entm’t Ass’n, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 277 (Tex. 2011),
cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1146 (2012).
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projected to raise $40 million of revenue per year for the state. 49
Illinois instituted a $3-per-customer tax effective January 2013. 50 At
least three other states have contemplated similar proposals. 51
The movement to “go green” has included a movement to target
sin taxes at eco-unfriendly activities. So-called “eco-taxes” are being
levied on behaviors such as paper and plastic bag use, bottled water
consumption, and carbon emissions. 52 In fact, the disposable bag tax,
first passed in the District of Columbia, is now proposed or enacted
in at least thirty other jurisdictions. 53 While a few of these targeted
activities may be able to fit into traditional concepts of “sinful”
behavior, many include things that are not sinful per se but are
instead judged by the majority to be unwise or undesirable. 54

49. The proceeds are earmarked for causes such as helping the victims of sexual assault.
Associated Press, Texas Slaps “Pole Tax” on Strip Clubs to Benefit Rape Victims, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 2007; Emily Ramshaw, Strip Bars May Face State Fees, DALLAS MORNING NEWS,
Feb. 13, 2007. For a detailed analysis of this tax see Morse, supra note 1.
50. Susanna Kim, Illinois Governor Approves Strip Club “Skin Tax” to Fund Rape Crisis
Center, ABC NEWS, Aug. 20, 2012, available at http://abcnews.go.com/Business/illinoispasses-skin-tax-strip-clubs-joking-matter/story?id=17044255.
51. California has proposed a $10 per-customer tax. A.B. 2441, 2011–2012 Assemb.
(Ca.
2012),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_24012450/ab_2441_bill_20120224_introduced.html. In Georgia, State Senator Jack Murphy
proposed a $5-per-visit pole tax on patrons of strip club establishments, with the revenue
going to fund new rehabilitation centers for teenage prostitutes. S.B. 91 passed committee, but
was pulled from the floor on before getting a vote. See Pole Tax Makes National News,
available at http://www.georgialegislativewatch.com/2009/03/23/pole-tax-makes-nationalnews/. Pennsylvania also proposed a $5 per-customer tax. Pole Tax Proposed for Pennsylvania
Strip Clubs, YAHOO.COM (Feb. 20, 2008) http://voices.yahoo.com/pole-tax-proposedpennsylvania-strip-clubs-1009791.html. See also http://www.salon.com/2012/05/27/
taxing_strip_clubs_for_rape/.
52. Dan Shapley, An Eco-Sin Tax on Bottled Water: Chicago and the 7 Sins of Bottled
Water, THE DAILY GREEN (Dec. 24, 2007), http://www.thedailygreen.com/environmentalnews/latest/bottled-water-tax-47122402. In November 2006, voters in Boulder, Colorado
passed what is proclaimed to be the first municipal “carbon tax” in the nation. City of Boulder,
Colorado, Boulder Voters Pass First Energy Tax in the Nation (Nov. 8, 2006),
http://web.archive.org/web/200703090850
15/http://www.bouldercolorado.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6136
&Itemid=169.
53. See FLA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION, RETAIL BAGS REPORT FOR THE
LEGISLATURE 3 (2010); L.A. COUNTY’S PLASTIC BAG WORKING GROUP, AN OVERVIEW OF
CARRYOUT BAGS IN LOS ANGELES COUNTY 1 (2007). Justin Higginbottom, Bag Taxes
FOUNDATION
(May
12,
2010),
Disappointing
in
Debut,
TAX
http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/26285.html.
54. Bartlett, supra note 5, at 1289 (“In recent years, there have been many efforts to
expand sin taxes to include other activities that are thought to be socially harmful—or perhaps
just not socially favored.”).
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On the other end of the spectrum, lawmakers are attempting to
legalize or expand the tax base for products or activities they have
previously denounced or banned. 55 Several states have legalized
gambling operations for the sole purpose of raising revenue from
gambling taxes. 56 According to the National Council of State
Legislatures, in the past few years, nineteen states have explored
gambling-related proposals as a way to balance their budgets. 57
Likewise, local and state lawmakers in Washington and Colorado
have already targeted the legalization of marijuana as a significant
source of tax revenue. 58 Washington State estimates it can generate
as much as $1.9 billion in additional revenue in the first five years of
its marijuana tax. 59 Colorado projects that it may be able to generate
an additional $67 million in marijuana tax revenue. 60 Lawmakers in
California have also proposed legalizing marijuana in order to bring
in an estimated $1 billion a year in state taxes, 61 and other states have

55. This phenomenon is not new. A primary reason for the end of Prohibition was the
government’s need to raise additional tax revenue from the alcohol excise tax. Id. at 1290;
LEONARD V. HARRISON & ELIZABETH LAINE, AFTER REPEAL: A STUDY OF LIQUOR
CONTROL ADMINISTRATION 173 (1936).
56. Steven Malanga, The State Gambling Addiction, available at http://www.cityjournal.org/2012/22_3_gambling.html. See also Dana Radcliffe, Should States Raise Revenues
POST
(Aug.
30,
2011),
by
Expanding
Legal
Gambling?,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dana-radcliffe/should-states-raise-reven_b_942118.html.
57. Kristi Keck, Strip Clubs, Marijuana Eyed During Budget Crunch, CNN (July 28,
2009), http://articles.cnn.com/2009-07-28/politics/states.budget.crunch_1_budget-gapsstate-legislatures-taxes?_s=PM:POLITICS.
58. Indeed, a 2010 study from Cato Institute estimates that legalizing marijuana would
generate $8.7 billion in federal and state tax revenue annually.
59. Office of Secretary of State, I-502—Fiscal Impact Statement, available at
http://vote.wa.gov/guides/2012/I-502-Fiscal-Impact.html.
60. See Alison Vekshin, Washington Races Colorado for Billions in Pat-tax Revenue,
(Jun.
23,
2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06BLOOMBERG,
24/washington-races-colorado-for-billions-in-pot-tax-revenue.html. Moreover, the City of
Denver recently approved a five percent tax on recreational marijuana that is expected to
generate $9.2 million in revenue. This is in addition to a potential fifteen percent state excise
tax and a ten percent special sales tax. See Matt Ferner, 5 Percent Recreational Marijuana Tax
Approved by Denver City Council, HUFFINGTON POST, (Jul. 30, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/30/denver-marijuana-tax_n_3676106.html. See
also, Vekshin, supra.
61. A proposal in California would generate an estimated $1 billion a year in state taxes.
See Stephen Easton, Legalize Marijuana for Tax Revenue, BUSINESS WEEK,
http://www.business
week.com/debateroom/archives/2010/03/legalize_marijuana_for_tax_revenue.html
(last
visited Sept. 17, 2013). See also Jake Neher, Pot for Potholes? GOP State Lawmaker Wants Legal
RADIO
(Sept.
19,
2013)
Marijuana
to
Pay
for
Roads,
MICHIGAN
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begun to contemplate similar proposals. Medical marijuana already
provides a substantial source of revenue for several states and cities. 62
D. Expanding Sin Tax Justifications
In addition to merely addressing revenue-shortfall concerns, sin
taxes are also used to influence taxpayer behavior. Historically,
Pigovian-type sin taxes have been proposed in order to help people
take into account the negative externalities their consumption
behaviors produce. 63 By levying taxes that approximate the societal
costs their consumption generates, taxpayers are forced to internalize
the total cost of their behaviors, including the costs they do not bear
directly. A Pigovian tax thereby alters the price of the underlying
product or activity, decreasing its consumption to a socially optimal
level. Pigovian taxes are viewed as an efficient way to correct negative
externalities. 64 In the sin tax context, taxes on tobacco, alcohol, and
fatty foods have been rationalized on Pigovian grounds. 65
The rise of behavioral economics has given politicians another
avenue to justify imposing new sin taxes on previously ignored
behaviors. Behavioral economists believe that through the imposition
of taxes regulators may be able to effectively “de-bias” individual
decision-makers. 66 They argue that individuals are afflicted by
http://michiganradio.org/post/pot-potholes-gop-state-lawmaker-wants-legal-marijuana-payroads (discussing proposal to legalize and tax marijuana in Michigan).
62. Michael Cooper, Struggling Cities Turn to a Crop for Cash, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2012, at A22 available at www.nytimes.com/2012/02/12/us/cities-turn-to-a-crop-for-cashmedical-marijuana.html (discussing large medical marijuana tax revenues obtained in Oregon,
Maine, Oakland, Denver, and Colorado Springs).
63. See William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON.
REV. 307, 307–08 (1972) (arguing that for externalities of the public goods variety, like
pollution, Pigovian taxes are sufficient to achieve an efficient allocation of resources).
64. Id.
65. For example, smoking cigarettes is purported to generate any number of
externalities, including second-hand smoke and increased public healthcare costs. See also Jeff
Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The Role of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1232 (July 2005) (“Engaging in risky dietary behavior creates externalities
above and beyond the moral-hazard externality that follows from mandatory
insurance coverage.”).
66. See Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 4. Specifically, policymakers believe they have the
ability to increase individual welfare by eliminating cognitive biases without limiting their
choices. However, as more recent scholarship has persuasively argued, these behavioral
economists are unable to prove that their proposed social and economic interventions are able
to, in fact, either improve individual welfare or do so without affecting individual liberty. See,
e.g., Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism,
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hyperbolic discounting, or present-bias, because they place too much
weight on the present relative to the future. 67 As a result, individuals
systematically make decisions today that their future selves would not
want them to make. For example, individuals may “consume too
much and exercise too little” in the present, even though the same
individual, in hindsight, will wish that he or she had made more
healthy decisions in the past. 68 Thus individuals, on their own, are
not capable of making rational decisions that maximize their personal
welfare. In order to correct these biases, some behavioral economists
have proposed the imposition of sin taxes. 69 It is not at all evident
that lawmakers will be able to make any de-biasing policy that is
welfare improving. 70 Nevertheless, the growing push for these types

2009 BYU L. REV. 905 (2009).
67. Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 666, at 912 (citing Ran Kivetz & Anat Keinan,
Repenting Hyperopia: An Analysis of Self-Control Regrets, 33 J. CONSUMER RES. 273, 282
(2006); id. (citing Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O’Donoghue, Time
Discounting and Time Preference: A Critical Review, 40 J. ECON. LITERATURE 351, 393–94
(2002)).
68. Id.
69. A problem that has received a lot of attention from behavioral research scientists is
the obesity epidemic. Approximately two-thirds of all American adults and nearly one-third of
children are overweight or obese. Researchers publishing in the Archives of Internal Medicine
recently suggested that taxes should be used as a weapon in the fight against obesity, citing
findings that suggest that alterations to the prices of unhealthy foods could help steer U.S.
consumers towards a more healthy diet. It has likewise been argued that sin taxes on food can
serve as a “self-control device,” aiding individuals in fighting the addictive nature of certain
unhealthy foods. Kiyah J. Duffey et al., Food Price and Diet and Health Outcomes: 20 Years of
the CARDIA Study, ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED., Mar. 2010, at 420. In studying the effect of
food prices on unhealthy foods over a twenty-year period, they observed that a ten percent
increase in cost was linked with a seven percent decrease in the amount of calories consumed
from soda and a twelve percent decrease in calories consumed from pizza. They estimate that
an eighteen percent tax on these foods could cut daily intake by fifty-six calories per person,
resulting in a weight loss of five pounds per person per year. Id. See also Mitchell H. Katz &
Rajiv Bhatia, Food Surcharges and Subsidies: Putting Your Money Where Your Mouth Is,
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED., Mar. 2010, at 405 (recommending unhealthy food tax as a way to
help to correct a market that favors unhealthy food choices over healthier options).
70. As argued by Mario J. Rizzo and Douglas Glen Whitman, in order for lawmakers to
be able to make any de-biasing policy that is welfare improving, they must achieve the
formidable task of being able to:
(1) identify agents’ “true” preferences that are to be maximally satisfied; (2)
determine the extent of each cognitive bias or decision-making problem; (3)
properly account for privately adopted self-debiasing measures, as well as how
paternalist policies would affect such measures; (4) deal with the problem of
interdependent biases; (5) anticipate unraveling and unlearning effects; and (6)
account for heterogeneity in the population with respect to all of these factors.
Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 666, at 910.
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of tax-related fixes by behavioral economists and regulators provide
another avenue for politicians to extend the already expanding sin
tax base.
III. AN EXPLORATION OF TAX SALIENCE
Even though legislators are readily enacting new sin taxes, a key
normative question remains: How can sin taxes be most efficiently
structured? Traditional scholarship on sin taxes has focused on
longstanding economic theories of supply, demand, elasticity, and
externalities, all of which have provided a critical foundation for the
examination of sin taxes. 71 From this literature, basic concepts of
how taxes affect efficient markets have become imbedded principles
in the tax discourse. Taxes are generally believed to generate
deadweight losses as a result of taxpayers adjusting their behavior to
avoid the tax. These traditional finance principles assume, however,
that individuals fully optimize with respect to taxes they incur. 72
An increasing amount of new empirical and theoretical
scholarship on tax salience has focused on the previously asserted
notion that not all similarly priced taxes will change taxpayer
behaviors equally. 73 There is mounting empirical evidence that the
salience of a tax will affect, at least in part, how an individual
responds. 74 The less salient the tax, the less taxpayers will adjust their
demand in response to increases in the after-tax price, resulting in
fewer economic distortions. 75 To be clear, when I refer to salience, I
am referring to so-called economic or market salience. This is to be
distinguished from political and other forms of salience, which are
also found in the tax salience literature. 76 Specifically, as used herein,

71. See, e.g., DePippo, supra note 27, at 546; W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and
the Social Consequences of Smoking, TAX POL’Y AND THE ECON., no. 9, 1995 at 51; Baumol,
supra note 63.
72. Chetty et. al., supra note 6, at 1145; Galle, supra note 6, at 66 (citing RICHARD A.
MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (5th ed.
1989)).
73. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 6, at 77 (“Where individuals do not fully perceive the
burden of a tax, or where not all individuals perceive it, the total behavioral changes in
response to the tax, whether in voting or consumption, are smaller.”); See also, Gamage &
Shanske, supra note 6; Chetty et al., supra note 6, at 1146; Finkelstein, supra note 6.
74. Chetty et al., supra note 6, at 1146; Finkelstein, supra note 6, at 971.
75. Chetty et al., supra note 6, at 1172–73; Goldin, supra note 6, at 3; Gamage &
Shanske, supra note 6, at 61–62; Galle, supra note 6, at 77–78.
76. See, e.g., Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 20 (defining “political salience” as
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tax salience refers to the effect the presentation of a potential tax has
on a consumer’s ability to take into account the full after-tax cost of
the product or service prior to making a consumption decision. The
salience of a sin tax will depend in large part on how the tax is
implemented. A traditional sales tax has a low salience level, while an
excise tax is generally fully salient (or salient neutral). For analytical
purposes, I will assume a tax is fully salient to the extent that the
taxpayer fully optimizes with respect to changes in the tax of the
product in the same way he or she would respond to a change in the
underlying price.
Instinctual and anecdotal notions about the impact of tax
salience on taxpayer decision-making are not new. 77 However, the
empirical evidence to support these intuitions has only begun to
emerge over the past few years. 78 As suggested by the empirical
literature discussed below, adjusting the salience of taxes can impact
overall efficiency by reducing the deadweight loss associated with
substitution effects. While the research in this area is still relatively
underdeveloped, an examination of the findings to date reveals
important assertions that may have a significant impact on sin
tax design.
A. The Empirical Studies
Until recently, empirical work specifically testing the impact of
tax salience has been missing from the salience literature. 79 In the
seminal study on tax salience, Raj Chetty, Adam Looney, and Kory
how “tax presentation affects voting behavior and political outcomes”).
77. Galle, supra note 6, at 95 (citing James M. Buchanan, The Fiscal Illusion, in PUBLIC
FINANCE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESS: FISCAL INSTITUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE 135,
135 (1967)), (claiming “diminished visibility of taxes will increase the likelihood that
individual taxpayers will free-ride on the efforts of others to oppose any tax increase”).
78. Related to the work on tax salience is empirical work regarding price splitting,
whereby total costs are split into their various components (such as shipping and handling and
other fees and taxes). When total costs are portioned, consumers may underestimate the total
value of their consumption. For review of this literature, see Galle supra, note 6, at 71, citing
John M. Clark & Sidne G. Ward, Consumer Behavior in Online Auctions: An Examination of
Partitioned Prices on eBay, 16 J. MARKETING THEORY & PRAC. 57, 57–66 (2008); Tanjim
Hossain & John Morgan, . . . Plus Shipping and Handling: Revenue (Non) Equivalence in
Field Experiments on eBay, 6 ADVANCES ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 1–4 (2006); Vicki G.
Morwitz et al., Divide and Prosper: Consumers’ Reactions to Partitioned Prices, 35 J.
MARKETING RES. 453, 453–63 (1998).
79. Finkelstein, supra note 6, at 970 (“Empirical evidence of the impact of tax salience
on tax rates . . . has proved extremely elusive.”).
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Croft examined the effect of salience on taxpayer behavior in two
ways. 80 First, they studied the effect of posting more salient taxinclusive prices at grocery stores. They modified the prices for 750
products at one Northern California grocery store to reflect their
after-tax cost (the applicable sales tax rate was 7.375 percent) and
over a three-week period compared changes in demand with two
control groups. 81 One control group consisted of non-adjusted, pretax labeled similar products in the same aisle of the same store, and
the other was pre-tax labeled control products at two other nearby
stores. 82 They found that posting tax-inclusive prices reduced
demand by roughly eight percent relative to the control groups. 83
They were also able to conclude that this difference was not
attributable to taxpayer ignorance. The median customer was able to
report the average sales tax rate within a half-percentage point of the
actual rate and correctly report the tax status of seven out of eight
products, even though only approximately thirty percent of all
products in the store were subject to the local sales tax. 84
Chetty, Looney, and Croft also observed overall changes in
alcohol demand following state-level increases in excise taxes and
state-level increases in sales taxes. 85 Excise taxes are levied at the
wholesale level and are included in the shelf or restaurant menu
price, whereas sales taxes are assessed at the register and are thus less
salient. 86 They found that tax increases in the form of excise taxes
reduced overall alcohol consumption significantly more than
increases in sales taxes, further supporting the hypothesis that

80. Chetty et al., supra note 6.
81. Id. at 1146. The sales tax was applied to cosmetics, hair care accessories, and
deodorant. See id. The original pre-tax sales tags were left unaltered, but new tax-inclusive sales
tags were added directly below the original sales tags. Id.
82. Id. at 1152. The control products in the same store were similarly taxed personal
products including toothpaste, skin care, and shaving products. The control stores were in
nearby cities with demographics similar to the treatment store. Id.
83. Id. at 1146.
84. Id. at 1150, 1165.
85. Id. at 1158–64. The tax rates for wine, beer, and spirits may vary within states. The
article presents results for beer consumption only, which accounts for the largest share of
alcohol consumption in the United States. Id. at 1158. However, they ran a parallel analysis for
a smaller subset of years and yielded similar results. Id.
86. Id. at 1158. Hawaii includes sales taxes in shelf prices and was thus excluded from
the experiment. Id.
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consumers do not always fully account for taxes not included in the
shelf price when making consumption decisions. 87
In another recent study, Amy Finkelstein examined the effect of
the introduction of electronic toll collections on driver elasticity in
the face of toll rate increases. 88 She found that drivers were
significantly less responsive to increases in toll rates following the
introduction of electronic tolls as compared to prior periods. 89 They
were also less sensitive relative to other contemporaneous drivers that
used manual toll collections. 90 In fact, she found that toll rates were
twenty to forty percent higher than they would be without electronic
toll collection. 91 Unlike the Chetty, Looney, and Croft study,
however, she also observed that surveyed drivers from Massachusetts
and New Jersey that used the electronic toll system were generally
unaware of their toll costs. 92 In Massachusetts eighty-five percent of
drivers that used electronic tolls incorrectly estimated their toll
collections as compared to only thirty-one percent of cash-paying
drivers. 93 Likewise, in New Jersey eighty-three percent of drivers that
used electronic tolls incorrectly estimated their toll costs as compared
to forty percent of cash payers. 94
Finally, Kelly Gallagher and Erich Meuhlegger examined the
impact of tax incentives on hybrid car sales. 95 In examining incentives
offered by state governments between 2000 and 2006, they
concluded that sales tax waivers had a greater than tenfold impact on
sales than did similarly sized tax credits. 96 This finding is presumably

87. Id. at 1160. Specifically, they found that a one percent increase in the gross-ofexcise-tax price is estimated to reduce beer consumption by 0.88 percent, whereas a one
percent increase in the gross-of-sales-tax price is estimated to reduce beer consumption by 0.20
percent. Id.
88. Finkelstein, supra note 6.
89. Id. at 971.
90. Id.
91. Id. (“[W]hen the proportion of tolls paid using ETC has diffused to its steady state
level of about 60 percent, toll rates are 20 to 40 percent higher than they would have been
under a fully manual toll collection system.”).
92. Id. at 980–81 (finding the awareness difference of toll costs between electronic and
cash paying drivers to be both economically and statistically significant).
93. Id. at 981.
94. Id.
95. Kelly Sims Gallagher & Erich Muehlegger, Giving Green to Get Green? Incentives
and Consumer Adoption of Hybrid Vehicle Technology, 61 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1
(2011).
96. Id. at 1, 9 (estimating that a $1,000 tax waiver is associated with a forty-five percent
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consistent with the other tax salience studies because while the sales
tax exemption directly affects the purchase price at the time of sale,
the tax credit is not realized until the taxpayer later files his or her
income tax return. 97 Due to the magnitude of the purchase, the
overall price (including sales tax) is a focus for car shoppers to a
significantly greater degree than with respect to regular purchases
subject to sales tax. Thus, the hybrid sales tax exemption is relatively
more salient than the hybrid tax credit.
Collectively, this empirical evidence suggests that consumers
systematically under-respond to taxes that are not included in their
list price. Taxpayers do not fully take into account taxes that have a
lower salience and are more likely to make consumption decisions
based on pre-tax prices. As a consequence, reducing the tax salience
of sin taxes can reduce the substitution effects caused by the
imposition of taxes. 98 In this way, imposing less salient taxes on
consumer goods and services can yield similar efficiency benefits as
imposing taxes on inelastic goods. 99 As compared to an equivalent
higher salience tax, the less salient tax can have a lower
deadweight loss. 100

increase in hybrid vehicle sales, whereas a $1,000 dollar income tax credit is associated with a
three percent increase in hybrid vehicle sales). Even when incentives are measured relative to
vehicle MSRP, they find a sales tax waiver equal to one percent of the retail price results in an
8.3 percent increase in sales, whereas a comparable income tax credit is associated with a 0.6
percent increase in retail sales. Id.
97. But see Galle, supra note 6, at 76–77 (criticizing Gallagher’s and Muehlegger’s study
for not controlling for any number of factors).
98. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 64; Goldin, supra note 6, at 10 (“[T]he less
salient a tax is, the more it mutes consumer substitution away from the taxed good, thereby
reducing the deadweight loss typically associated with non-lump-sum taxes.”).
99. Galle, supra note 6, at 62. (“It follows that an unnoticed tax is, like a tax on highly
inelastic behaviors, potentially more efficient than more obvious excises.”).
100. One important point to mention is that even if society’s overall welfare is improved
through the reduction of deadweight loss, individual welfare may be diminished. That is, to
the extent an individual overpays for a particular item because of the decreased salience of the
tax, the individual’s welfare is reduced. However, that reduction is offset by the increase in
taxes collected by the government, so it theoretically balances out assuming tax revenues are
not wasted. Id. at 79 (citing Raj Chetty et al., Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence, 1–2
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 13330, 2007).
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B. The Criticisms of Low-Salience Taxes
Notwithstanding the potential efficiency benefits that can be
realized through the imposition of low salience taxes, several
criticisms and countervailing considerations have been expressed,
including notions of fairness, distribution concerns, and possibilities
of distortionary income effects. In my view the most persuasive
concern is the potential creation of distortionary income effects.
However, none of these considerations appear fatal to the potential
beneficial uses of low salience taxes.
1. Lack of transparency
First, general notions of fairness and consumer awareness have
prompted several countries to implement mandated tax-inclusive
shelf pricing for consumer goods. 101 The motivations behind these
laws are expressed through general concerns regarding transparency
and consumer awareness. 102 The E.U. Directive, for example, cites
the assurance of “precise, transparent, and unambiguous information
for consumers concerning prices” as the reason behind its law. 103
Recent U.S. legislation requiring airlines to include taxes in their
advertised ticket prices is justified on similar grounds. 104 In relevant
part, the press release from the U.S. Department of
Transportation states:
The new rules . . . will make it easier for passengers to determine
the full price they will have to pay for air transportation prior to
travel. Currently, airlines and ticket agents are allowed to publish
ads that list government-imposed taxes and fees separately from the
advertised fare, as long as these taxes and fees are assessed on a perpassenger basis. However, sometimes the notice of these taxes and
fees is not obvious to consumers. Under the new requirements, all

101. See Holderness, supra note 15, at 783 (noting the European Union, Israel, and New
Zealand all require tax-inclusive pricing).
102. Jacob Nussim, Taxes, Prices, and Consumer Protection 5 (Bar-Ilan U. Pub. Law
Working Paper, Jan. 20, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1397643 (citing
Directive 98/6/E.C. of the European Parliament and of the Council (Feb. 16, 1998), Official
Journal of the European Communities L80/27 (Mar. 18, 1998)).
103. Directive 98/6/E.C. of the European Parliament and of the Council (Feb. 16
1998).
104. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Transp., supra note 18.
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mandatory taxes and fees must be included together in the
advertised fare. 105

In other words, the regulators seemed concerned that the old pricing
model was insufficiently transparent to consumers because the taxes
were displayed in a low salience way.
I believe that these concerns are overstated. As articulated by
Deborah Schenk, transparency and salience are not interchangeable
concepts, and one can exist without the other. 106 The term
“transparency” has come to mean many things in the political and
academic discourse, although lack of transparency is almost always
viewed negatively. 107 Lack of transparency generally occurs when the
public lacks or is generally unaware of necessary information. 108
Salience, on the other hand, does not necessarily depend on
transparency. 109 Tax salience refers to the extent to which consumers
take into account the after-tax cost of a good or service prior to
making their consumption decision. It does not necessarily imply
that they are not aware of the tax or that it is somehow “hidden”
from them. 110 In fact, the two empirical studies that looked at
consumer awareness were divided as to their findings as to the
potential link between tax salience and transparency. Although the
drivers in Finkelstein’s study were generally unaware of the imposed
tolls, in the Chetty, Looney, and Croft study the average consumer
was aware of both the applicable tax rate and the tax status of the
subject items. 111

105. Id.
106. Schenk, supra note 6, at 256–58, 286.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 257 n.6 (citing Cheryl D. Block, Pathologies at the Intersection of the
Budget and Tax Legislative Process, 43 B.C. L. REV. 863, 903 (2002) (“[T]ransparency surely
requires that information be available to the public.”)).
109. Id. at 286 (finding “so long as the [low salience] provisions [are] adopted publicly
and their effect [can] be understood . . . , the transparency criterion [is] satisfied”).
110. The nomenclature of “hidden” taxes has been used in the academic tax salience
literature. See, e.g., Galle, supra note 6. Several tax scholars have rejected this label because of
its pejorative connotation. See, e.g., Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 24; Schenk, supra
note 6, at 262–63.
111. Compare Finkelstein, supra note 6, at 696 (“[D]rivers are substantially less aware of
tolls paid electronically.”), with Chetty et. al., supra note 6, at 1147 (“[T]he customers kn[e]w
what [was] taxed, but focus[ed] on the posted price when shopping. . . . The median
individual correctly reported the tax status of seven out of the eight products on the survey.”).
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Even if, as a normative matter, transparency is determined to
have an inherent social value that is worth preserving in spite of
potential efficiency losses, the Chetty, et. al., study demonstrates that
tax salience does not necessarily have to come at the expense of
transparency. Overriding concerns regarding transparency can be
best justified when consumers have no basis for computing the total
price of a product because they lack the necessary information to do
so. This is to be distinguished from adjusting the relative ease with
which taxpayers are able to compute their ultimate tax liability,
which is the effect of adjusting tax salience.
The average taxpayer in the Chetty, et. al., study evidently
possessed the knowledge necessary to determine the after-tax cost of
his or her purchases prior to checking out at the register. They
merely chose not to do so, and this choice may have been entirely
rational. For example, the cost to the taxpayer of determining the
after-tax price of the product in terms of time and energy spent may
have been outweighed by any potential benefit to the taxpayer of
doing so. 112 Thus, without more substantial evidence regarding the
correlation between low salience taxes and transparency, I do not
believe general notions about consumer awareness should override
the efficiency benefits of low salience taxes.
2. Distribution concerns
Concerns regarding the potential distribution effects of low
salience taxes have also been raised. 113 Sin taxes have long been
regarded as regressive, thereby disproportionally affecting lowincome taxpayers. 114 For example, a $3 cigarette tax will represent a
much higher percentage of a poorer person’s income than it will of a
wealthy person. This type of tax can violate general “ability-to-pay”
principles, which dictate that taxes should be assessed in relation to
the taxpayer’s economic wealth or income. 115

112. See Galle, supra note 6, at 100 (“[T]he taxpayer expects to come out ahead in terms
of her well-being, on the assumption that the disutility of having to compute her tax is larger
than the subjective present discounted value of the tax.”).
113. Id. at 100–04.
114. See, e.g., Andrew J. Haile, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1041, 1050 n.49 (citing CONG.
BUDGET OFFICE, U.S. CONG., HISTORICAL EFFECTIVE TAX RATES, 1979–1997, at 10 (2001)
(“[E]xcise taxes claimed five times the share of income from the lowest-income households
that they claimed from the highest-income households.”).
115. See Mona L. Hymel, Consumerism, Advertising, and the Role of Tax Policy, 20 VA.
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A concern is that if low salience taxes are used to further raise the
dollar value of sin taxes, the regressive effect will be amplified.
Although distributive goals play an important role in our tax system,
I believe the potential incremental effects, if any, on distribution
resulting from low salience can be mitigated. First, there is currently
not enough data regarding the incidence of low salience taxes to
make any conclusions regarding their distributive effects. 116 In fact,
there is evidence that cuts both ways. 117
There is reason to believe that low-income taxpayers are less
susceptible to low salience taxes because they are more budgetconstrained. 118 For example, suppose Taxpayer A and Taxpayer B are
both planning to purchase a sin tax item that is subject to a low
salience tax of $2 and has a pre-tax cost of $5. Suppose further that
Taxpayer A is budget-constrained and only has $15 total left to
spend for the rest of the month and Taxpayer B has $500 left to
spend for the rest of the month. It seems logical to assume that
Taxpayer A will be more likely to base his consumption decision on
the after-tax price of the good than will Taxpayer B since the $7
after-tax price of the good will absorb almost half of Taxpayer A’s
remaining disposable income for the month. The cost of the
calculation is much more likely to be outweighed by the benefit of
knowing the final cost of the good. If this intuition is correct, then
lower income taxpayers should be more likely to be unaffected by
the salience level of taxes because they will have a greater interest in
basing their decision on the after-tax cost of products.

TAX REV. 347, 359 (2000) (“Fairness in our tax system stands out as one of the most
important criterion [sic].”).
116. Galle, supra note 6, at 100 (“[T]here are gaping holes in our current information
about the incidence of hidden taxes. First, we do not know for certain whether the behavior
effects of hiding taxes are largely intentional or unintentional. Neither do we know, if taxpayers
are acting mostly unintentionally, how taxpayers might adapt to their own shortcomings. Both
questions are important to the distributive inquiry. Indeed, the distributional results would
seem completely different depending on the answers.”); Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at
78 (“The existing empirical literature does not provide cause for thinking there are strong
negative distributional implications to reducing market salience.”).
117. Galle, supra note 6, at 100; Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 78.
118. Schenk, supra note 6, at 296 (“The conclusion that low-income taxpayers pay less
attention to all low salience taxes is far from robust, and the evidence that exists cuts both
ways. Although one might expect low-income taxpayers to be more attentive to low salience
taxes because of their budget constraint, there is some evidence that, with respect to the
purchase of certain consumer goods, they are not.”).
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Even if this intuition is incorrect, other adjustments can be made
to counteract any actual distributive effects that lower salience taxes
may cause. One solution could be to adjust the income tax rates to
counteract any imbalance in the sin tax distribution. 119 For instance,
to the extent that revenue bases from sin taxes are increased, the
government could reduce the income tax burden on lower-income
taxpayers. Another way to address distribution effects could be to
implement a disproportionate amount of low salience taxes on goods
targeted at high-income taxpayers. In any event, because the
existence of a distributive problem has not yet been established, and
solutions exist to counteract the effect if they do exist, I do not
believe that distribution concerns defeat the case for low
salience taxes.
3. Distortionary income effects
Finally, a countervailing efficiency effect of reducing tax salience
is that it may cause distortionary income effects. The traditional
neoclassic economic model assumes that taxpayers fully optimize
with respect to taxes. 120 Income effects are usually disregarded
because decreases in individual budgets are offset by increases in
societal wealth. 121 With respect to an increase in low salience taxes,
however, the concern is that taxpayers facing an overall lower budget
may make optimization errors and misallocate their income among
the goods they need to purchase. 122 An optimization error will occur
if the taxpayer purchases a different mix of goods than he or she
would if they were subject to a lump sum tax. Specifically, they may
purchase luxury goods first and not have any remaining funds to
purchase necessity items. If taxpayers are deprived of necessities, this
will lead to distortionary income effects. 123 This concern is
heightened for low salience taxes levied on budget-constrained
consumers. 124 The overall magnitude of income effects will depend

119. See Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 78.
120. Chetty et al., supra note 6, at 1145.
121. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 66.
122. Goldin, supra note 6, at 9.
123. Taxpayers’ reduced consumption of high curved utility goods (i.e., necessities) in
favor of less curved utility goods (i.e., luxuries) will result in a distortionary income effects and
overall utility loss. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 67 n.223.
124. One potential counter-argument is that lower income taxpayers may be less subject
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in part on how consumers adjust their consumption in response to
their increased tax burden.
As modeled by Chetty, Looney and Kroft, taxpayers have three
possible methods for adjusting their consumption in the face of
budget constraints. 125 Let’s assume that Taxpayer C plans to
purchase N Goods (which are necessities such as food and shelter)
and L Goods (which are luxury items such as a car and travel) in a
particular month. In the face of budget constraints caused by low
salience taxes, Taxpayer C may purchase N Goods first and then use
her remaining funds to purchase L Goods. Consumers making
budget adjustments under this model may not incur any
distortionary income effects. 126
Taxpayer C may instead, in anticipation of a lower overall
budget, reduce both her consumption of N Goods and L Goods.
Under this method, the resulting budget allocation may only yield
minimal distortions, and any resulting utility losses should be
outweighed by efficiency gains derived from decreased
substitution effects. 127
However, under the third model, Taxpayer C may purchase L
Goods first and therefore be forced to significantly reduce her
purchase of N Goods. In this case, Chetty, et al., conclude the
resulting efficiency loss to Taxpayer C potentially could be greater
than the deadweight loss of a fully salient tax. 128
Although the results of a budget adjustment under the third
model could potentially be fatal to any potential efficiency gains,
Gamage and Shanske minimize these concerns. They argue that
distortionary income effects should only defeat the benefits of low
salience when low salience taxes are imposed on “irregular
expenditures and activities of credit-constrained taxpayers” and
“when there are long time delays between market choices and tax
assessment.” 129 With respect to sin taxes, the first of these concerns is
most relevant. For example, low salience taxes should not be used on
big-ticket items such as cars where the potential impact of an underto the salience bias because they are more conscious of their consumption costs. See Gamage &
Shanske, supra note 6.
125. Chetty et al., supra note 6, at 1174.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 67–68.
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perception of taxes could cause a significant cash flow problem for a
for a budget-constrained taxpayer.
Along similar lines, a recent economic model developed by Jacob
Goldin suggests that as long as absolute tax values are small, the
distortionary income effects resulting from reduced salience are
second-order and are outweighed by the overall decrease in
substitution effects and additional revenue raised. 130 He also finds
that the optimal level of low salience tax is non-zero, even taking
into account distortionary income effects. 131 This suggests that as
long as the absolute value of a low salience sin tax is kept relatively
small, then any distortionary income effects should be minimal.
Thus, the concern of distortionary income effects should be able to
be neutralized by not imposing high value, low salience taxes on
goods and by not imposing low salience taxes on high value or
irregular items.
Although the concern regarding distortionary income effects is
significant, the situations in which they will overcome any offsetting
efficiency gains from low salience taxes are limited and can be
mitigated through tax design mechanisms. Although the tradeoff
between reduced substitution effects and increased distortions from
income effects must be considered, lawmakers should be able to
structure taxes in a way to account for these effects and design taxes
that capture the benefits of low salience. 132

130. Goldin, supra note 6, at 11 (“[B]y making the tax a little less salient, the
government can raise the same amount of revenue while reducing the tax’s distortionary effects
on consumption, thereby reducing the traditional source of excess burden. Although the
reduction in salience does drive consumers to accidentally over-consume x relative to y, the
utility cost of that optimization error is trivial when the tax is close to fully salient; because
consumers facing a fully-salient tax align the marginal utility of expenditures on x and y,
consuming a little too much x relative to the optimum will not generate much less utility than
if the consumer had purchased y instead.”).
131. Id. at 3.
132. Gamage & Shanske, supra note 6, at 65 (“[C]oncerns over distortionary income
effects have been overemphasized; we argue that distortionary income effects are only likely to
defeat the simple case for reducing market salience under a limited set of conditions—namely,
either when taxes are imposed on irregular purchases made by credit-constrained taxpayers, or
when there are long time delays between market decisions and tax assessments”).
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C. Other Elements of Salience

1. Overall levels of salience
In order to adequately examine tax salience, it is important to
establish a baseline or definition of “full” salience. Consistent with
terminology used by other scholars, I believe a tax is fully salient if
the consumer fully takes into account the tax-inclusive price when
making his or her consumption decision. 133 For example, suppose a
bottle of soda has a pre-tax price of $1.79, and lawmakers would like
to assess a sugary-beverage tax on the product of 10 cents per bottle.
If the tax is implemented in the form of a typical excise tax, the shelf
price will include the tax and be $1.89. Assuming no other sales or
excise tax applies, this sugary-beverage tax would be considered fully
salient because the tax is fully incorporated into the price presented
to the consumer prior to purchase. Most traditional economic
models assume that a taxpayer is responding to a fully salient tax. 134
By contrast, if the tax is levied in the form of a sales tax and the
ultimate cost is only presented to the taxpayer on his or her final
receipt, this tax can be considered to have a relatively lower level of
tax salience. That is, the likelihood of the taxpayer fully accounting
for the true after-tax cost of the product prior to the purchase is
diminished. That is not to say that the taxpayer is somehow unable
to figure out the total after-tax cost prior to making a consumption
decision. Rather it means, as evidenced by the empirical studies, that
because the tax is less salient taxpayers will systematically underaccount for the true after-tax price of the product when making their
consumption decisions. 135 As a consequence, in certain situations
lower salience taxes can be more efficient for purposes of raising
revenue because they can reduce the deadweight loss generated by
substitution effects.
Not only can a tax have low or full salience, I also argue that a
tax can have high salience. 136 While a tax-inclusive shelf price would

133. See, e.g., Chetty et al., supra note 6, at 1169.
134. Id. at 1145.
135. Id. at 1175.
136. I attach a different meaning to the term “high salience” from the one Lilian
Faulhaber ascribes to “hypersalience.” See Faulhaber, supra note 15, at 1309. She defines
hypersalience as occurring “when a tax provision is fully—or almost fully—salient, but the
limits restricting that provision’s application are hidden, or less salient.” Id. at 1309. Using the
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reflect a fully salient tax, to the extent the tax is somehow further
highlighted or presented to the consumer such that they overaccount for its tax effect, then the tax would have a high level of
salience. As a result, it is possible that the inverse conclusions reached
with respect to low salience taxes may be true. That is, when faced
with a high salience tax, taxpayers may over-adjust their demand
relative to the actual price increase of the tax.
Although only anecdotal, evidence that this phenomenon may
occur can be found in the implementation of the nation’s first singleuse bag tax in the District of Columbia. In 2010, lawmakers enacted
a 5-cents-per-bag tax that was projected to bring the District $3.5
million in annual revenue. However, the decline in single-use bags
greatly exceeded lawmakers’ expectations, and revenue collections
fell far short of projections. Bag use during the first month dropped
from an average pre-tax monthly use of 22.5 million down to only
3.3 million. 137
Although empirical work certainly would need to be done to
substantiate this claim, one potential explanation for the drastic
reduction in single use bags in the face of such a nominal tax is that
they are levied in a highly salient manner. Consumers are forced to
either directly affirm or help calculate their bag tax owed at the point
of purchase. For example, at a grocery store or drugstore checkout,
the consumer first has to affirmatively state (or respond yes to an
inquiry) that he or she would like to use a plastic bag. Then either
the taxpayer or cashier counts the total number of bags used and the
consumer is charged five cents for each bag. If a taxpayer uses selfcheckout, after the purchases are scanned, the computer will prompt
him to enter the total number of bags used and calculate the tax
accordingly. This method of taxation may be viewed as going
beyond the full salience achieved by tax-inclusive shelf pricing. Not
only are consumers aware of the total amount of tax they must pay,
they also must affirmatively elect to pay, and perhaps help calculate,
the tax.

charitable deduction as her primary example, she claims that taxpayers overestimate the tax
savings because they underestimate the limits restricting their ability to realize the savings.
137. Justin Higginbottom, Bag Taxes Disappointing in Debut, TAX FOUNDATION (May
12, 2010), http://www.taxfoundation.org/publications/show/26285.html; Tim Craig, Bag
Tax Raises $150,000, but Far Fewer Bags Used, WASH. POST (Mar. 29, 2010), available at
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dc/2010/03/bag_tax_raises_150000_but_far.html?wprss
=dc.
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While the demand for single-use bags is presumably quite elastic,
there is reason to believe that other factors, in addition to price,
caused the dramatic decline in demand. First, the eighty-five percent
decline in a single month is dramatic in light of the relatively
nominal charge of five cents. Even if a consumer used five plastic
bags in a single visit, this would result in an additional twenty-five
cents paid. Although typically passed in low salience forms, other
similarly nominal tax increases on goods such as soda have resulted
in a negligible decrease in consumption. 138 It is possible that other
phenomena, such as the endowment effect or loss aversion are in
play. 139 It is also plausible that because taxpayers are able to avoid the
tax at the time of imposition (e.g., by carrying their groceries out
without a bag even if they do not bring their own), that they more
frequently opt out of the tax, even if they otherwise would have used
plastic bags in the absence of a levy. Nevertheless, I argue that at
least in part, the decrease in demand is caused by the highly salient
nature of the tax.
2. Salience and elasticity
In addition to the overall level of tax salience, the efficacy of tax
salience in sin tax design is also influenced by the underlying
elasticity of the product being taxed. If a good or service is inelastic,
then changes in price will have a relatively low effect on demand. 140
From an efficiency perspective, taxes on inelastic products will
generate less deadweight loss than taxes on more elastic goods. 141
Taxes on inelastic goods can typically be sustained at higher absolute
levels than their elastic counterparts. This may or may not result in
higher overall collection amounts depending on the size of the levy
and the size of the product base. By contrast, the demand for elastic
goods can change significantly if the (perceived) price changes. Thus,
under traditional public finance principles, taxes levied on elastic

138. Jason M. Fletcher, David E. Frisvold, Nathan Tefft, The Effects of Soft Drink Taxes
on Child and Adolescent Consumption and Weight Outcomes, 94 J. OF PUB. ECON. 967, 972
(2010).
139. See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the
Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98(6) J. OF POL. ECON. 1325, 1326–28 (1990).
140. See, e.g., J. A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation,
38 REV. ECON. STUD. 175, 175–208 (1971).
141. Id.
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goods will generate a larger excess burden because consumers will
more frequently alter their consumption decisions to avoid the tax. 142
As a normative matter, it follows that the benefits of lower tax
salience will be lessened to the extent that the taxed product is
inelastically demanded. Deadweight losses are already minimized
because customers are not significantly reacting to price changes.
Conversely, with respect to elastic goods, the optimal tax salience
may be lower. Lower salience can help to mute taxpayers’ responses
to the price change resulting from the tax, thereby yielding greater
efficiency gains. A recently developed economic model by Jacob
Goldin confirms this intuition. 143 He finds that optimal salience is
lower for relatively elastic goods because the more readily consumers
can substitute away from a specific good, the greater the welfare gain
will be from reducing that substituting behavior. 144
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR SALIENCE IN SIN TAX DESIGN
I believe that the recent empirical work regarding tax salience
provides significant insight into the optimal design of sin taxes. In
order to adequately assess the proper integration of salience into sin
tax policy, I believe that the compounding factors and considerations
discussed above need to be integrated into the analysis. Specifically,
the optimal degree of tax salience will depend on the price elasticity
demand for the taxed good or service and the underlying objective
of the tax. Taking into account the economic implications of low,
neutral, and high salience taxes as well as the impact of elasticity and
revenue generation goals, my aim is to discuss the implications of
using salience in sin tax design for four types of sin taxes: (i) sin taxes
primarily intended to raise revenue; (ii) Pigovian sin taxes; (iii) sin
taxes intended to de-bias taxpayers; and (iv) mixed-motive sin taxes
that are levied with more than one underlying goal in mind. While
these groupings are not intended to be rigid or precise, they are
intended to depict general claims regarding the optimal structure of
sin taxes.

142. Goldin, supra note 6, at 12.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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A. Salience, Sin Taxes, and Revenue Generation

All taxes either have the intent to, or in fact do, raise revenue.
That is the nature of a tax. When lawmakers propose to make broadbased tax increases, the motive is generally clear—the government
needs additional revenue to fund its budget. Even though the vast
majority of sin taxes are similarly revenue-motivated, an increasing
number of them are motivated (or purportedly motivated) on
behavioral grounds. 145
However, sin taxes are primarily being used as budget gap fillers,
and revenue generation is paramount. With respect to this goal,
lowering the salience of a tax may help to increase the absolute
amount of a tax without incurring any additional deadweight loss.
Stated differently, if deadweight loss is held constant, a less salient
tax should be able to be sustained at a higher absolute rate than its
fully salient counterpart. Again, this intuition is similar to that
employed with respect to taxes levied on inelastically demanded
goods, which can be sustained at higher levels than those on more
elastically demanded goods without generating additional
deadweight losses.
As discussed above, when sin taxes are levied on inelastic
products or services, the benefits of utilizing low salience methods
are diminished. 146 Taxes on inelastic products already yield efficiency
benefits vis-à-vis their elastic counterparts, because the diminished
elasticity in taxpayer demand reduces substitution effects and
deadweight loss. In terms of revenue generation, the more inelastic
the good, the higher the absolute dollar amount of tax can be
sustained without significant efficiency losses from substitution
effects. Although low value taxes can certainly be imposed on
inelastic goods, overall efficiency gains may be realized if taxes can be
raised on inelastic goods and lowered on other more distortionary
bases (e.g., the income tax), while still maintaining the same
budgetary levels. Even though many taxes on inelastic products
impact a smaller base, the revenue generation potential is nonetheless

145. In order to make the proposals more acceptable to the public, the focus or purpose
of the tax is too often shifted away from the underlying revenue needs and onto the targeted
behavior. For example, rather than simply state that the government is facing record deficits
and will levy a tax on sodas to raise necessary funds, the bill will be shopped as a way to raise
money to help fight obesity.
146. See supra Part III.C.2.
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very high due to the higher absolute level of tax typically imposed. 147
In terms of the salience, due to the increased risk of income effects
associated with high-value, low salience taxes, full salience design
methods are likely optimal. 148 This will help prevent distortionary
income effects from defeating any incremental efficiency gains that
would be achieved by lowering the tax salience.
On the other hand, revenue-generating taxes on elastic goods
have much more potential to benefit from a low salience structure.
Lawmakers should be able to generate efficiency gains by lowering
the salience and reducing taxpayer substitution effects. In order to
mitigate the potential countervailing efficiency losses from
distortionary income effects, the overall magnitude of the tax should
be relatively low. 149 Even with relatively low salience, small observed
price changes might induce taxpayers to substitute elastically
demanded goods. Nevertheless, because of the potentially large tax
base for most elastic goods, even nominal increases in low salience
tax values should be able to raise substantial revenue and allow the
government to reduce other more distortionary taxes.
B. Salience and Pigovian Taxes
On the other hand, the use of low salience taxes may not be as
clear with respect to sin taxes that are being levied on behavioral
grounds. 150 Pigovian taxes may need to be fully salient in order to
strictly achieve their corrective goals. 151 Social welfare generally can

147. Lawmakers should take care not to make the sin tax too high. If the tax creates
significant price differences in neighboring jurisdictions, it can trigger rampant smuggling and
black markets. A classic example of this phenomenon is the New York City cigarette tax, where
as the result of a nearly $3 per pack tax, the total cost of a pack of cigarettes is over $9. In
2007, counterfeit American cigarettes could be found for sale from street vendors and in
variety stores in Chinatown for approximately $4.00 a pack, approximately half of the legal
price. See Angelica Medaglia, Cigarettes Are Costly, but Often Less So in Chinatown, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at B2.
148. See supra Part III.B.3.
149. Id.; Goldin, supra note 6, at 9.
150. See Schenk, supra note 6, at 276 n.101 (“Low salience taxes or provisions would be
counterproductive with respect to Pigovian taxes that are intended to change behavior.”);
Goldin, supra note 6, at 18 (“When consumption of x generates a negative (positive)
externality, the optimal salience for taxes on x is higher (lower) than if no externality was
present.”).
151. Many sin taxes are ripe for a Pigovian justification because they target disfavored
behaviors that produce some negative externality. For example, so-called fat taxes can
purportedly be justified on Pigovian grounds. Jeff Strnad, Conceptualizing the “Fat Tax”: The
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be enhanced by imposing taxes equal to negative externalities—costs
borne by persons other than the consumer making the decision. 152
The objective of a Pigovian tax is to force the consumers to
internalize, through the increased after-tax price, the social cost of
their consumption decision in order to reach an optimal level of
consumption. If the consumer does not perceive the social cost of his
action because the tax is not fully salient, the corrective potential of
the Pigovian tax is undermined. 153
In order to achieve its corrective goals, the value of a less salient
Pigovian tax would need to be raised to the point where the
consumer fully perceives the cost of his externalities and alters his or
her consumption behavior to the socially optimal level. Doing so,
however, would penalize the consumer by over-charging for the
externalities he or she generates. 154 While making a precise
determination of the Pigovian tax needed to make the consumer
perfectly internalize her externalities is not necessarily feasible, when
lawmakers significantly exceed the Pigovian-neutral point, the tax
may become a mere revenue raiser at the expense of the Pigovian tax
target and/or may over-reduce the optimal level of consumption.
Even in this case, however, Pigovian taxes may improve overall
efficiency if the increased revenue is used to decrease other distortive
taxes, such as the income tax. It may be preferable to lawmakers to
over-reduce negative externality producing behaviors than to overreduce income. 155

Role of Food Taxes in Developed Economies, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1221, 1232 (July 2005)
(“Engaging in risky dietary behavior creates externalities above and beyond the moral-hazard
externality that follows from mandatory insurance coverage.”).
152. See William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AMER.
ECON. REV. 307, 307–08 (1972) (arguing that for externalities of the public goods variety,
like pollution, Pigovian taxes are sufficient to achieve an efficient allocation of resources).
153. “When a Pigovian tax increases social welfare by discouraging taxpayers from
engaging in a particular activity, the government will face an additional efficiency cost to
reducing the salience of that tax.” Goldin, supra note 6, at 15. Conversely, when the taxed
activity generates positive externalities, the efficiency benefits to relying on low salience taxes
are greater than would otherwise be the case.
154. Despite the potential fairness concerns, Gamage and Shanske seem to be willing to
make the tradeoff between low salience benefits and over-correcting for externalities. Gamage
& Shanske, supra note 6, at 73 n.244.
155. See infra Part IV.D.
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C. Salience and Taxpayer De-Biasing
In addition to addressing externalities, some taxes are proposed
as a way to cure cognitive failures of consumers, who are unable to
make consumption choices that maximize their individual welfare.
Individuals have a bias towards getting benefits or rewards now and
incurring costs later. This causes individuals to make present
decisions that yield a current benefit but may cause long-term harm,
even though the same individual, in hindsight, will wish that he or
she had made a different choice. 156 In order to help individuals
maximize their personal welfare, taxes are imposed to help them debias. Presumably, consumers will need to perceive a relative increase
in the cost of the unhealthy good or service for the tax to have a debiasing effect with respect to their consumption choices. 157 Thus,
similar to the intuitions regarding Pigovian taxes, in order to truly
affect consumer behavior, these taxes should also be implemented in
more salient ways. 158
With respect to behavioral economists’ de-biasing objectives,
taxes on inelastic goods would need to be fully salient. Because the
demand for the product or service will be relatively insensitive to
price changes, lawmakers also will need to use full salience design
techniques in order for the taxpayer to modify his or her
consumption behavior. 159 Thus, structurally they may be
indistinguishable from purely revenue generating taxes on inelastic
goods. With respect to elastic goods, salience also should be full.
Because even small changes in the price can yield changes in
demand, if taxpayers are fully aware of the imposed taxes, they will
modify their behavior.

156. Rizzo & Whitman, supra note 66.
157. Goldin, supra note 6, at 19 (“For example, to reduce population weight, a number
of states levy sales taxes on soda and/or candy while exempting other food purchases from the
sales tax base. Although this approach may increase the true relative price of unhealthful foods,
the analysis here suggests that such taxes would be more likely to generate the intended
behavioral effects if they were designed in more salient ways.”).
158. I am in no way endorsing the use or efficacy of these types of taxes. Rather, I am
arguing that if these types of taxes are going to be implemented, in order to achieve their
stated goal, they should be in more salient forms. In fact, with respect to sin taxes, it is not
clear how lawmakers can devise specifically calibrated tax rules to counteract this flawed
decision-making process on an individual level.
159. See supra Part III.C.2.
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Sin taxes intended to de-bias taxpayers also present an
opportunity to implement high salience taxes. 160 Indeed, this type
of tax is arguably already being used to encourage taxpayers to
decrease their use of environmentally unfriendly disposable plastic
bags. 161 If the high salience presumptions discussed above are
confirmed, taxpayers will over-adjust their demand relative to the
actual price increase of the tax when faced with a high salience
tax. If lawmakers are able to maximize the salience level of the tax,
they should be able to achieve their desired behavioral goals at a
relatively lower absolute tax rate.
Notwithstanding the potential for an overall smaller tax rate,
the overall impact of high salience taxes on efficiency remains
unclear. I am not making any normative claim about the
desirability or efficacy of behaviorally motivated taxes. Rather I
am positing whether to the extent that taxes are being
implemented that are otherwise producing inefficiencies through
their behavior distortions, those distortions may be able to be
minimized by reducing their absolute dollar amount by increasing
their level of salience. To the extent that these types of high
salience techniques are used, in order to be welfare maximizing,
countervailing concerns of substitution effects and replacement
markets would also have to be taken into account. The overall
balancing of the offsetting welfare increasing and decreasing
effects would likely need to be conducted on a case-by-case basis.
When the imposition of sin taxes affects the after-tax price (or
in the case of a high salience tax, the perceived after-tax price) of
a good, some level of market reaction is expected to occur. Black
markets may develop, industry participants and their employees
may be significantly impacted, and replacement products or
activities may generate new or additional harms. For instance, if a
sin tax increase creates significant price differences in neighboring
jurisdictions, it can trigger rampant smuggling and black
markets. 162 This will harm local businesses in the sin tax market,

160. A high salience tax would be less efficient as a revenue raiser because consumers
would overreact to the levy by substituting away from the product to avoid the tax.
161. See supra Part III.C.1.
162. Robert A. Sirico, Sin Taxes: Inferior Revenue Sources, BUDGET & TAX NEWS,
July 2004, available at http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2004/07/01/sintaxes-inferior-revenue-sources. A classic example of this phenomenon is the New York
City cigarette tax, where as the result of a nearly $3 per pack tax, the total cost of a pack
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which will lose customers to businesses in their neighboring
jurisdictions and/or to local dealers in the black market. This can
have the undesirable effect of reducing the local tax base, while not
significantly affecting the consumption of the underlying good or
achieving the underlying behavioral objective. Moreover, the
public resources necessary to combat these illegal markets may
further undercut the tax’s ultimate revenue potential. 163 If taxpayers
in fact systematically over-respond to high salience taxes, they may
more readily resort to alternative markets to purchase their goods.
Another countervailing effect of high salience taxes may be an
increase in the negative effects of substituting goods. When, in
response to a sin tax, consumers choose to migrate to a replacement
good, any number of consequences can occur. While the sin tax
may influence people to stop engaging in one particular vice or
disfavored activity, there is no guarantee that they will respond
with mere abstinence or by replacing it with a less harmful
substitute. In fact, there is evidence that in many situations
equally, or even more, undesirable goods are consumed. 164
For example, increased taxes on liquor can influence people to
switch to drinking beer or hard drugs. 165 Research also shows that
any attempts to impose sin taxes on food must be done with
extreme care, because there is no guarantee that consumers will
not consume even less healthful foods as replacements. For
instance, consumption patterns suggest that if fat is taxed, then
individuals may increase their salt intake, thereby placing
themselves at a greater risk of high blood pressure and
cardiovascular disease. 166 Taxes on sugary beverages may lead to
the consumption of more diet beverages. Research has shown that
artificial sweeteners can actually increase a person’s risk of obesity,

of cigarettes is over $9. In 2007, counterfeit American cigarettes could be found for sale
from street vendors and in variety stores in Chinatown for approximately $4 a pack,
approximately half of the legal price. See Angelica Medaglia, Cigarettes Are Costly, but
Often Less So in Chinatown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at B2. In 2006, the New York
Department of health conducted a survey of smokers in New York City, half of whom
reported that they had purchased illegal cigarettes in the past year. Id.
163. Sirico, supra note 162.
164. This is particularly true when like vices face unequal tax burdens.
165. Sirico, supra note 162.
166. Oliver Mytton, et al., Could Targeted Food Taxes Improve Health? J. OF
EPIDEMIOLOGY & COMMUNITY HEALTH 61, 689 (2007).
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and long-term use can lead to other serious health problems. 167
Lawmakers cannot merely assume that soda will be replaced with
water, and chips will be replaced with apples.
Even when a substitute product is anticipated or even
encouraged by lawmakers, unforeseen consequences may still ensue.
For example, the taxes on single-use plastic bags are intended to
encourage consumers to use reusable bags instead; and these taxes
have been very successful in inducing consumers to make these
replacements. 168 However, new research is showing that the
tradeoff of single-use bags for reusable bags may not achieve the
anticipated environmental improvements. First, reusable bags
themselves may be harmful. Many of these bags are made from
non-recyclable materials and require far more energy to produce
than single-use bags. 169 In addition, because in many cases they are
not regularly cleaned, scientists have found that reusable bags can
spread harmful contaminants such as e. coli and other bacteria,
which can pose severe health risks to consumers. 170 Two recent
studies have shown that reusable bags can also contain excessive
amounts of lead. 171 Second, there are secondary uses of disposable
plastic bags that, if eliminated, require equally undesirable
replacements. Disposable plastic bags are often re-used in homes
as trash liners, lunch bags, or to clean up after pets. 172 Evidence
has shown that consumers still fill these needs, and instead buy

167. See generally Artificial Sweeteners Linked to Weight Gain, SCIENCEDAILY, Feb.
at
11,
2008,
available
http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/02/080210183902.htm.
168. The Wall Street Journal reported in 2008, “reusable totes [are] the nation’s
fastest-growing fashion accessory, with sales this year up 76% to date over last year.” Ellen
ST. J.
(Sept.
26,
2008),
Gamerman,
An
Inconvenient
Bag,
WALL
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122238422541876879.html.
169. Id.
170. See Reusable Grocery Bags Contaminated with E. Coli, Other Bacteria,
PHYSORG.COM (June 24, 2010), http://www.physorg.com/news196621909.html.
171. Kelly Zito, Studies Find Lead in Reusable Shopping Bags, THE SAN FRANCISCO
CHRON. (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Studies-find-lead-inreusable-shopping-bags-2461560.php. (“Seventy-one polypropylene bags and inserts from
44 retailers, universities and government agencies were collected and tested by an
accredited Seattle laboratory, Wilson said. Of those, 16 had lead levels above the 100
parts per million threshold that a coalition of state environmental agencies and industry
groups consider harmful in product packaging.”).
172. Higginbottom, supra note 53.

181

DO NOT DELETE

3/10/2014 11:19 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2014

items such as trash can liners and pet bags, which are merely
another form of disposable plastic bags. 173
While these specific secondary effects relate to the sin tax on
disposable plastic bags, the negative unintended consequences are
not unique, but rather illustrative of a fundamental problem with
sin taxes intended to modify taxpayer behaviors. Lawmakers must
be very careful to mitigate any potential significant harmful market
and efficiency effects when designing these types of sin taxes,
even if they are levied at seemingly small or innocuous levels.
D. Salience and Mixed-Motive Sin Taxes
It is possible that lawmakers will support a sin tax on the
basis of both behavioral modification and revenue generation
grounds. That is, they may have mixed motives for their proposed
sin tax. The amount of desirable salience in these situations is
much less clear. This is particularly true when the relative
importance of the goals is not known because the two goals can
operate at cross-purposes. In structuring the tax, policymakers will
have to balance wanting to discourage the undesirable behavior on
the one hand and wanting to encourage it on the other in order to
maintain or broaden their revenue base. 174 This potential vacillation
muddles the theoretical analysis because, with respect to elastic
goods for instance, although behavioral goals can be best achieved
with full salience taxes, lower salience is typically preferable for
revenue generation.
The existence of mixed-motive sin taxes is nearly inevitable
and is often met with suspicion as to the true underlying objective
of the lawmakers. As discussed above, sin taxes are being primarily
used as budget gap fillers. However, in order to make the proposals
more acceptable to the public, the focus or purpose of the tax is
often shifted away from the underlying revenue needs and onto the
targeted behavior. For example, rather than simply state that the
government is facing record deficits and will levy a tax on sodas
to raise necessary funds, the bill will be shopped as a way to raise

173. For example, when Ireland introduced a 20-cent tax on plastic bags, it was
reported that the sale of trash can liners increased by seventy-seven percent. Id. (citing
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2008/rpt/2008-R-0685.htm).
174. Sirico, supra note 162.
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money to help fight obesity. 175 In more egregious situations,
lawmakers will refuse to even give the label of “tax” to the revenue
raiser in hopes of deflecting all potential opposition. For example,
when defending the proposed bottled water tax in Florida, Senator
Evelyn Lynn stated: “This is not a tax[.] It’s a surcharge to save the
environment.” 176 Meanwhile the tax was projected to add $42.3
million into Florida’s recession-ravaged treasury.177
In other instances, lawmakers will present the sin tax as a way
to stop individuals from engaging in certain behaviors, but the
actual amount of the proposed tax will be insufficient to achieve
that purpose. For example, a lawmaker may propose a one or two
cent per can tax on sodas, and justify the levy in terms of
targeting unhealthy behaviors. In truth, however, the lawmakers
and experts have no expectation that the modest price increase will
have any effect at all on consumption levels, and indeed share
this intuition with the lobbyists ready to oppose the bill. 178
In Washington, D.C., for example, lawmakers enacting the 5cents-per-bag tax projected that annual revenue for D.C. would
approach $3.5 million. However, when the decline in single-use
bags greatly exceeded lawmakers’ expectations, revenue collections
fell far short of projections. Revenues totaled only $2 million
during the tax’s first year, with bag use during the first month
dropping from the pre- tax monthly use of 22.5 million down
to only 3.3 million. 179 One may only conclude that while D.C.
lawmakers intended to have some impact on the consumption of
single-use bags, they really did not anticipate consumers virtually
abandoning their use altogether. Although environmental advocates
may be pleased that fewer bags were used, budget-conscious

175. See supra Part II.C.
176. See News Service of Florida, Bottled Water Tax Is Back, available at
http://www.jaxobserver.com/2010/03/24/bottled-water-tax-is-back/.
177. Id.
178. Strnad, supra note 65, at 1226 ( citing Michael F. Jacobson & Kelly D.
Brownell, Small Taxes on Soft Drinks and Snack Foods to Promote Health, 90 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 854, 856 (2000)).
179. Bag use during January 2010, the first month of the tax, dropped to 3.3 million
bags issued, drastically down from the 22.5 million bags per month used during 2009.
Higginbottom, supra note 53; Tim Craig, Bag Tax Raises $150,000, But Far Fewer Bags
POST,
(Mar.
29,
2010),
Used,
WASH.
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dc/2010/03/bag_tax_raises_150000_but_far.html.
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lawmakers have to be disappointed that less revenue
was collected.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to achieve mixed-motive
objectives by combining relatively higher value tax amounts with
lower salience if that is the true intention of the lawmakers. For
example, given a particular tax value and salience point, if the
value of the tax is increased, we can expect taxpayers to increase
their response to the tax (with the greater response coming from
more elastic bases). This is helpful from a behavioral standpoint if
the goal is either Pigovian or de-biasing. However, if the base is
relatively elastic, we can expect the revenue potential to be muted
because too many taxpayers will substitute products in order to
avoid the tax. 180 This is why an increase in the absolute value of a
mixed-motive tax would need to be accompanied by a commiserate
reduction in tax salience. Lawmakers would have to delicately
balance these offsetting effects in order to achieve both behavioral
and revenue goals.
V. CONCLUSION
While the magnitude and scope of new sin taxes have
exploded over the past decade, substantive explorations of the
recent phenomenon in the academic literature have generally lagged
behind. While there is still much more empirical and theoretical
work to be done before definitive conclusions can be reached, it
is still worthwhile to advance the theoretical analysis of the
potential effects of tax salience. I believe that the recent empirical
findings regarding salience provide potentially significant insight
into the proper role and design of sin taxes in our modern
economy. By correctly exploiting the attributes of low, full, and
high salience taxes, lawmakers should be able to devise more
efficient ways to raise revenue and modify consumer behaviors.

180. Because the cigarette tax base is substantially inelastic, some jurisdictions still
are able to continue to raise revenue through increased cigarette taxes. However, once
taxes become too high (or relatively high in comparison to other substitute markets),
demand will drop and revenue collections will decline. See W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette
Taxation and the Social Consequences of Smoking, in TAX POL’Y AND THE ECON. 51, 75
(James M. Porterba ed., 1995); Willard G. Manning et al., The Taxes of Sin: Do Smokers
and Drinkers Pay Their Way?, 261 JAMA 1604, at 5 (1989) available at
http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2009/N2941.pdf.
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